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Gordon Christie
Indigeneity and Sovereignty in Canada’s Far North:  
The Arctic and Inuit Sovereignty
A century after excitement peaked around the 
race to the North Pole and the drive to navigate 
the Northwest Passage, the Arctic has reentered 
the imagination of those living below the 60th 
parallel. As temperatures dramatically rise, the 
focus now shifts to “opening up” the region, with 
debates swirling around questions of jurisdic-
tion, travel and shipping, security, resource man-
agement, and environmental protection. Eight 
Arctic states bordering or close to the Arctic 
Ocean (Russia, the United States, Norway, Fin-
land, Sweden, Iceland, Canada, and Denmark 
[in relation to Greenland]) dominate these dis-
cussions, not only in how these debates progress 
but in how they are framed and understood. The 
states bordering the Arctic Ocean, however, all 
contain Indigenous populations, communities 
composed of people whose lives, cultures, histo-
ries, and societies predate the imposition of the 
nation- state on them, people who have lived on 
the northern cap of the globe for thousands of 
years.
 The content and tone of current debates 
about the Arctic are captured in Michael Byers’s 
Who Owns the Arctic? which provides a window 
into how certain kinds of language and ways of 
framing issues and solutions can pull everyone 
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into particular ways of thinking about fundamental matters.1 It is a text 
that pays considerable attention to the Inuit living within Canada, high-
lighting both how they accept their place within Canada and how they can 
act as potentially powerful allies in bolstering Canada’s claims to the Arc-
tic Archipelago (ninety- four major islands and more than thirty- five thou-
sand minor islands extending toward the North Pole from Canada’s Arctic 
coastline).2 It is not misrepresentation to make these two points—some-
what surprisingly, given an early history of mistreatment, paternalism, and 
exploitation, the Inuit across Canada’s north generally welcome their status 
as Canadian citizens and do act willingly to assist in strengthening Canada’s 
northern claims. Byers tells this part of the story, however, in the context of 
other, “larger” affairs—the strategic positionings of nation- states in poten-
tial conflict over lands, water, and other resources; the concern over domes-
tic and international security; and worries about how resource exploitation 
and transport might pose environmental concerns. These matters emerge 
as direct and vital concerns and interests of nation- states (clearly linked 
to concomitant concerns of transnational corporations and other business 
interests). Only when tied into the concerns of nation- states and their eco-
nomic situations do we see expression of concern for the interests of the 
Indigenous inhabitants of the north.
 This sort of telling of a story within a larger framework—a larger 
story, if you will—is the focus of this essay. My focus is on one word, sov-
ereignty, that serves to ground meaning in the larger story and plays a cen-
tral role in generating and upholding a web of meaning within which are 
captured the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. I want to examine how this 
word works its magic and to suggest that another word, Indigeneity, not only 
can help make clear how words and stories function in this setting but can 
also suggest how Indigenous peoples of the Arctic—in particular, the Inuit 
in Canada—can usefully meet stories with stories, words with words.
 One might wonder, however, about the value in thinking about how 
language functions in debates about the Arctic, given that the real prob-
lems seem to be around such pressing matters as the minimal regulation 
of ever- accelerating resource exploitation, the significant increase in transit 
of ships and cargo through just- now- opening routes, the pollution that has 
already concentrated in dangerous levels in country food3—all manifesta-
tions of what one might think of as the looming threat of a second stage of 
colonization. Yet the very fact that such a second stage is looming should 
push us back into concerns over language.
 Reflecting on how Canada has historically interacted with Inuit living 
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within its borders illuminates both the first stage of colonization and recent 
developments that might be characterized as moments of decolonization. 
After paying little attention to the far north (other than ensuring that some 
efforts were made periodically to bolster its claims to the archipelago), the 
Canadian government began to get serious about the administration of the 
north during and after World War II. Within the space of a generation, 
tremendous cultural shifts were affected: families were pulled into per-
manent settlements, children were put in schools, Indigenous languages 
began to slip, and the first lurch toward anomie was felt across the Inuit 
communities. Things began to shift again, however, as a result of strong 
1970s activism (and realization by authorities in the south that there might 
be considerable wealth locked away under the Beaufort Sea and the tundra). 
Modern agreements began to reconfigure the north. Today the Inuvialuit in 
western Canada continue to work on self- government negotiations (twenty- 
five years after settling land and resource issues), the Inuit of northeastern 
Canada are continuing their efforts to work out a public form of govern-
ment in the new territory created as a result of the Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement, and the Inuit of both northern Quebec and Labrador enjoy 
comprehensive modern treaties. What began with a long stretch of benign 
neglect, followed by a period of powerful paternalism, has recently led to 
movement away from the centralist (south- centered) model of governance.
 The new threat of massive intrusions by the Canadian government—
fueled by powerful desires for the store of resource wealth formerly safe in 
the far northern vault—is only now building, as the second stage of colo-
nization looms. Will the inflow of drilling rigs, mining companies, explo-
ration camps, and all the other paraphernalia of the modern industrial 
complex coincide with slippage back to a mode of governance dominated 
by southern institutions? Here is where language—more particularly, dis-
course and narrative4—comes into the picture. Why would the assumption 
be that the Canadian government could simply reassert control over affairs 
in Canada’s Arctic? How did they assume this authority more than a cen-
tury ago? How is it that arguments and debates around the opening up of 
the Arctic all seem to function within a form of discourse that assumes the 
sovereign authority of Canada and the other Arctic nation- states?
 The key term, again, is sovereignty. The actions that would constitute 
a second wave of colonization threaten disruption across the north, but 
they happen only as outcomes of deliberation. If we limit the term action 
to self- directed movement, then all activities in the Arctic are directed by 
consideration and deliberation (a few tied to individual self- directed action, 
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the vast majority being the result of collective processes). A tremendous 
amount of investigation, assessment, and planning would go into decision- 
making processes around a new wave of mass intrusion into the Arctic, as 
those who already assume control (“jurisdiction”) over the region mull over 
what courses of action they will follow. We can see how the potentially dev-
astating actions of second- stage colonization will happen only as a result 
of prior “cultural” activity (that is, through the mechanisms of decision 
making at play at this time, in this place). It is within these mechanisms 
that certain symbolic preconditions of deliberation operate—these are the 
larger forms of understanding through which are made understandable the 
sorts of thinking processes that ultimately lead to certain forms of action.
 This schema allows us to marvel at how the processes of consider-
ation and deliberation—conducted via the medium of language—may also 
function to limit action itself. This idea expands on the hint above—that all 
this has to be understood in a cultural sense—though in following through 
on this expansion we inevitably slip into matters of politics. We begin by 
noting that certain linguistic elements do not simply instrumentally assist 
in the formation of plans and strategies, rather, they serve to define a range 
of possible plans and strategies. One such key element is the term sover-
eignty. Quietly residing in the background, it provides a certain kind of con-
ceptual structure to be applied to the very acts of investigation, assessment, 
and planning. Not only are certain parties simply assumed to be vested with 
the proper authority in making decisions that will affect all those who live 
in the Arctic, but how these parties think and act are assumed to be the only 
vehicles or mechanisms by which legitimate actions are first imagined and 
then instantiated. Here forms of language and action outcomes are linked 
together in a way that seems to preclude the sensibility of other ways of 
thinking and acting.
 Emerging from a particular history, the concept of sovereignty has 
developed a core of meaning (surrounded by varying matters of ambiguity). 
It captures the sense of a state’s enjoyment of “supreme authority within 
a territory.” While the core attributes remain fairly fixed, varied theories 
abound about the concept and its place in modern society. For my pur-
poses the important points have more to do with how this notion functions 
than with whether it is justifiable—or, indeed, dangerous—in the modern 
world. The five nation- states bordering the Arctic Ocean assert sovereignty 
over the landmasses, islands, and territorial waters that border or lie within 
this oceanic region. In doing so they lay before the world claims that pur-
portedly provide them “supreme authority” over these territories. Compli-
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cating matters is the fact that the Arctic is, essentially, an ocean—subject, 
for example, more to the United Nations’ Law of the Sea than to the sov-
ereignty of individual states that might have land within or touching on 
this region.5 However, with the continuing expansion of territory to include 
more extensive areas of water contiguous with shorelines—now extending, 
in some matters, out to two hundred nautical miles offshore—sovereign 
authority has come to reach into large parts of the Arctic Ocean.6
 But what is it to enjoy supreme authority within a territory? And why 
is this simply assumed to describe the nature of nation- state presence in 
the Arctic—indeed, of human presence in the north? Before investigating 
the latter question, let us explore the former, placing it within the context 
of the Arctic and its apparently imminent opening. The states bordering 
this region all lay claim to territory in the region, and on the basis of these 
claims, they collectively exert control over all matters that fall within their 
collective territories.7
 First, sovereignty is understood as denoting territorially based power, 
the ability to act in relation to defined lands (and not, for example, directly 
in relation to persons, objects, or events). A nation- state holding sover-
eign power does so in relation to its defined territory and enjoys under this 
power the highest degree of deference in relation to decisions it makes. 
Second, all other decision- making bodies either within or outside this terri-
tory must accede to the decisions made by this sovereign power within the 
scope of its territory. Finally, accession to decisions made by the sovereign 
applies to all within the territory, generating obligations on all to follow its 
commands—authority is conceived of as designating a right held by the sov-
ereign to be obeyed by all parties.
 In the Arctic, then, each nation- state with recognized territory is 
assumed to have the authority to make all decisions in relation to that 
nation’s defined expanse, where these decisions generate obligations on all 
those within these respective territories, obligations that are also expected 
to be respected by parties that exist outside this area. As a functional mat-
ter, then, nation- states act as if they enjoy the right to command obedience, 
as if they enjoy the right to be obeyed (in relation to fairly well- defined sub-
ject matters, in relation to their respective territories). Collectively, then, 
the nation- states of the Arctic act similarly in relation to the Arctic region, 
with acknowledgment among them that areas on which they cannot lay 
convincing claims will constitute open sea. Interestingly, it is not simply 
a matter of nation- states acting as if they have the right to be obeyed—
both citizens and noncitizens act as if nation- states are owed obedience in 
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this regard. In fact, what makes this structure function discursively is the 
interplay between the various parties that collectively constitute the nation- 
state—those parties who make decisions and those who not only abide by 
them but who vest them with legitimacy in their acceptance of the power 
that this structure generates and operates through.
 This set of understandings, as noted, acts to backstop the mass of 
other thinking about the Arctic—all the investigations, assessments, plan-
ning processes, and ultimate decision making run within a system of mean-
ings built on this sense of who makes ultimate decisions over which ter-
ritory. Given an emerging acknowledgment of the interconnectedness of 
the region (its nature as an integrated ecosystem), there is a fair measure, 
even an admirable one, of comanagement initiatives and arrangements. It 
is essential to note, however, that the very notion of such arrangements—
for example, the presentation of current agreements as the promising lead- 
in for stronger such arrangements in the future—is predicated on the fun-
damental assumption of the sovereignty model.
 The rest of this discussion follows the implications of these basic 
points down two paths. First, we explore what this implies for the Inuit 
should they wish to resist the second wave of colonization by reacting 
within the web of meaning built up around this fundamental notion. Sec-
ond, we explore what this implies should the Inuit wish to challenge this 
story as a story—that is, to reach up and beyond the level wherein sover-
eignty functions as a key element in a story being woven by nation- states 
to a level where story meets story and where the Inuit challenge the notion 
that this magical term can unreflectively act to channel all thinking about 
action in relation to the Arctic.
Resisting Sovereignty: From within the Story
There are various options and techniques available from within the narra-
tive spun by the nation- states, and the Inuit have already explored several 
of these. The Arctic Council, an influential advisory and decision- making 
body in the north, has evolved in such a way as to have a clear place for 
Indigenous communities and voices. One can read from the originating 
statement of this council the contours of decision making implicit in their 
collective understandings: “The Arctic Council is established as a high level 
forum to: provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic 
indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic 
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issues [not related to military issues], in particular issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”8 The declara-
tion goes on to delimit membership (later making clear that decisions of 
the council are made by consensus of the members): “Members of the Arc-
tic Council are: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian 
Federation, Sweden and the United States of America (the Arctic States). 
The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council and the Associa-
tion of Indigenous Minorities in the Far North, Siberia, [and] the Far East 
of the Russian Federation are Permanent Participants in the Arctic Coun-
cil.”9 Over the last fifteen years, this sort of arrangement has accorded a 
fair amount of indirect power to Indigenous peoples living across the Arc-
tic; Indigenous communities have been able to discuss matters of concern 
at some of the highest levels of nation- state decision making. It must be 
noted, however, that this is understood as due to the largesse of the nation- 
states. Only members of the Arctic Council make binding and authoritative 
decisions (at times with input from Indigenous peoples).
 If we begin with this model, imagining maximal impact from the 
voices of Indigenous communities, what can we conceive of as favorable 
outcomes for the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic? First, we need some 
sense of the outcomes currently in mind. To narrow our focus, consider 
what we can glean from the 2009 “Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sover-
eignty in the Arctic” (CIDSA). The Inuit Circumpolar Conference declares: 
“In the pursuit of economic opportunities in a warming Arctic, states must 
act so as to: (1) put economic activity on a sustainable footing; (2) avoid 
harmful resource exploitation; (3) achieve standards of living for Inuit that 
meet national and international norms and minimums; and (4) deflect 
sudden and far- reaching demographic shifts that would overwhelm and 
marginalize indigenous peoples where we are rooted and have endured.”10 
These four goals capture the most pressing concerns of the Inuit. There is 
clearly recognition of the direction in which things are moving: resource 
exploitation is already accelerating, and so the focus is on the mitigation of 
harmful resource extraction; economic development is the language of the 
south, and so the focus on its sustainability; and a second wave of coloniza-
tion is clearly visible on the horizon, and so the focus is on the devastating 
effects of marginalization.
 The declaration itself is an artful construction, masterfully push-
ing and pulling all the levers available in the sovereignty model. It speaks 
of anchoring “the actions of Arctic peoples and states, the interactions 
between them, and the conduct of international relations . . . in the rule 
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of law.”11 The law it would have rule is that which was historically con-
structed by (and, some would argue, almost entirely for) the nation- state. 
However, over the last five or six decades, this web of law has become 
rather complicated, and it now entangles states and Indigenous peoples 
in multiple strands of mutual obligations and responsibilities (on interna-
tional, domestic, and subdomestic levels). The Inuit of the Arctic can posi-
tion themselves—within the world built around meanings emerging from 
these interwoven legal fields—as “a people,” as an “Indigenous people,” 
as an “Indigenous people of the Arctic,” as “citizens of Arctic states,” as 
“Indigenous citizens of Arctic states,” and as “Indigenous citizens of each 
of the major political sub- units of Arctic states.”12 Each of these positions 
comes with strong constraining bonds but also with strong pulls on not 
only the consciences but the legal responsibilities of Arctic (and global) 
state powers. The call is for the Arctic state powers to acknowledge the rule 
of law, to accept the legal trappings that they themselves are bound by, and 
to continue to build on the “intergovernmental relations” that the Inuit see 
themselves engaged in when, for example, they sit at the table in the Arctic 
Council. This view of the nature of such interactions (as intergovernmen-
tal) is not one currently embraced by the Arctic states, but the Inuit are 
implicitly arguing in the declaration that this is a perspective they should 
adopt, both because it accords with the direction legal and political instru-
ments are tacking and it would simply make eminent sense.13
 Key to the strength of this argument is the ongoing transformation of 
the meaning and functionality of sovereignty within the international arena. 
In positioning themselves as “a people” and as “an Indigenous people,” the 
Inuit lay claim to forms of status that make serious calls on nation- states. 
As a people they have rights under such international instruments as the 
Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, while as 
an Indigenous people they can claim rights now articulated under the UN’s 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).14 These instru-
ments have effected tremendous change not only in understandings of the 
“absolute” nature of territorial sovereignty but in the nature and growth of 
international institutions. There is, however, some reason to be concerned 
with the promise of a path laid out according to the constellation of signs 
and symbols that still revolve around a fairly robust notion of “supreme 
power” vested in sovereign nation- states.
 By way of quick illustration, consider what many take to be the most 
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important provision of the UNDRIP, a section that played a major role in 
holding up a general vote on this declaration for quite some time. Article 3 of 
UNDRIP is at the center of the CIDSA call for a closer collaborative decision- 
making process between the Inuit and the Arctic states. It reads: “Indige-
nous peoples have the right to self- determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.” This section would seem to signal quite a 
shift in the distribution of legitimacy, allowing Indigenous peoples to radi-
cally challenge their place within states that may have colonized their lands 
and communities. It must be read, however, in conjunction with a later pro-
vision in UNDRIP, article 46: “Nothing in this Declaration may be inter-
preted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage 
in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United 
Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or politi-
cal unity of sovereign and independent States.” The sovereign authority of 
nation- states is the assumed backdrop to these sorts of instruments and 
is the background against which must be measured all attempts at resist-
ing second- wave colonization within the conceptual universe laid out on the 
basis of the sovereignty model. This does not imply that resistance of such 
form is futile or that it cannot improve the lives of the Inuit, even in the 
face of such looming threats. Resource exploitation, increased shipping and 
travel, and general economic development will continue to push up from 
the south, and resisting on multiple fronts—with weight on the rights of 
self- determination being softly recognized—will likely mitigate the impact 
of the changes this will bring about.15
 I would suggest, however, that entirely distinct strategies are avail-
able—strategies of resistance that do not work within the stories told by 
others. To explore these alternatives we first need to give some thought to 
how particular kinds of stories can function to guide or control thought and 
action.
Resisting Sovereignty: Story Meets Story
Imagine a people living within a self- contained normative universe. Such 
a people live within a world of meaning issuing from both world- creating 
and world- maintaining patterns—that is, how these people think about 
their existence (the reality they inhabit) will result to some degree from 
commonly shared (and collectively generated) patterns of thought and 
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from universal norms and precepts reflected in and maintained by insti-
tutional structures and processes. Robert Cover argues that all meaning 
is ultimately sourced in “commonalities of meaning,” patterns of thinking 
and acting that define the community itself. These commonalities work 
through our social body to “both ground predictable behavior and provide 
meaning for behavior that departs from the ordinary.”16 But in the genera-
tion of meaning is created the very condition for an excess of meaning—
differences of meaning emerge, and social forces are required to main-
tain order within this sea of diversity. These forces of maintenance police 
meaning, working to keep unified a community capable of diverse forms 
of thought and action.
 Narratives function, then, both to carry along commonalities of mean-
ing and to police meaning. They are the carriers of meaning itself—the 
stories we tell define who we are and how we think of the world—while they 
also work to control what can be thought (and so what we can see as “pos-
sible” action). This picture does not suggest how such narratives themselves 
might be potentially put to use—the picture is simply of the role that narra-
tives play in constructing social reality around us. Nevertheless, the move to 
their utility should be obvious—in some societies the availability of means 
by which people’s very thoughts (and so their actions) might be regulated or 
controlled will be noticed, desired, and acted on.
 The rest of the analysis in this essay does not rest on any deep com-
mitments to stories of manipulation or oppression by way of discourse. 
Whether forces within nation- states mean actively and intentionally to 
limit creative horizons through the deployment of larger frameworks of 
meaning is not a concern here. Instead, the focus is on the fact that these 
larger frameworks exist and function in this fashion, as without clear and 
constant attention paid to this phenomena the Inuit can lose sight of the 
second form of resistance to second- wave colonization, resistance that 
meets story with story.
 As noted earlier, sovereignty carries with it the notion of legitimacy—
the sovereign state acts as though it is owed obedience, while those affected 
by the acts of the sovereign state act as though they owe obedience to the 
state. There is a sense of “rightfulness” functioning in the mechanics of this 
picture, as those who live within and through the larger story dominated by 
the notion of sovereignty feel a normative pull, one tied to the sense they 
have that the sovereign state is the legitimate source, ground, and site of 
decision making over territory. In thinking about how one might challenge 
this “rightfulness,” how a party might challenge the sovereign exercise of 
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authority over a parcel of land, we can see the closing off of imagination—
the way rightfulness, legitimacy, and sovereignty function to police mean-
ing in ways that in this context aggressively constrain both diversity and 
creativity.
 Contemporary challenges to the rightfulness of authority over terri-
tory would be couched in terms interwoven in the pattern defined by the 
web of meaning generated around the concept of sovereignty. One might 
argue, for example, that the nation- state in question does not enjoy jurisdic-
tion over this piece of land (that it is controlled by another nation- state or 
that it is disputed territory). Alternatively, one might argue that some other 
legal interests intervene to temper the exercise of absolute power in rela-
tion to a particular subject matter (for example, human rights instruments 
might be brought to bear on whatever the particular situation in question 
might be, and pressure might force the state to alter its operations). Alter-
natively, one might argue that some factors in the situation might call into 
question the standing of the decision- making authority as constituting a 
sovereign entity.17 The first challenge is most common, as the lines on the 
globe dividing up the territories of states are not so clear and settled as to 
preclude disputes—witness the numerous problems swirling around both 
lands and waters in the Arctic. Interestingly, the second and third are imag-
inable but are both uncommon and treated differently. The first sort of terri-
torial dispute is understandable as a matter between recognized sovereign 
entities, while the second invites challenges to the authority of a sovereign 
state, and the third challenges the very identity of a potential “pretender” 
to sovereign status. Though the sovereignty model makes sense of the 
latter two sorts of challenges, they are properly seen as forms of conceptual 
boundary issues; the second is tied to questions about how the “supreme” 
authority of a sovereign state should bend to developments around things 
like human rights—and other trans- state concerns now gaining some trac-
tion as able to transcend sovereign authority—and the third to questions 
around how sovereign status itself is to be understood.
 The key point is that all these cognizable challenges are understand-
able only within the sovereignty model. Imagination itself is constrained 
within this model—our plans and strategies can reach out only this far. Are 
there really no other sensible ways that the sovereign claims of a nation- 
state might be challenged? The suggestion in this last section is that there 
are indeed sensible challenges but that their sensibility emanates from a 
very different vantage point. From this point, analysis is positioned so we 
can clearly see that the sovereignty model is but one way of making sense of 
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how people can think of themselves in relation to one another and to land. 
That this vantage point can be reached only by way of the terrain of Indige-
neity validates these sorts of challenges. It is the very fact of the Indigeneity 
of the Inuit—of their status as separate meaning- generating communities, 
living within other larger narrative structures they create—that makes this 
sort of resistance both possible and appropriate.
 Earlier in this essay, a question was posed about the assumption of 
sovereignty by Canada over the territory it now claims in the Arctic. We 
examined how the concept of sovereignty functions in this context but left 
unexplored how the story generated around this concept came to domi-
nate. A sketch of the story of the rise of this dominance suggests how 
the Inuit can today meet story with story. It begins with the fact of base 
or brute power. Over the course of the nineteenth century and into the 
middle of the twentieth, the Canadian state engaged in acts it understood 
as appropriate moves in the great game of international law, per other 
nation- states—moves it took to be grounding in particular its claims to 
the Arctic Archipelago. Exercising various forms and measures of de facto 
power and presence does not by itself, however, ground claims—claims 
are understandable only in the context of the rules of the game, the sorts of 
things established by and through narratives. The acts themselves are mere 
physical events—they become sensible as acts that attempt to ground sov-
ereignty in the context of a web of meaning already there, providing a nor-
mative framework for the physical actions. Where and when do we look for 
the genesis of this web of meaning?
 In the context of the histories of the Third World, Dipesh Chakra-
barty argues that the concepts lying at the heart of political modernity—
concepts that animated European Enlightenment through the nineteenth 
century—had an odd life in the colonial circumstance. The European colo-
nizer, Chakrabarty notes, “both preached this Enlightenment humanism at 
the colonized and at the same time denied it in practice.”18 Speaking more 
directly about the genesis of international law, Antony Anghie argues that 
the universal imposition of a sovereignty model comes about as a particu-
lar sort of response to early matters coming out of the colonial encounter.19 
In effect we could say that the current status of this model—its function in 
maintaining limits on the imagination—is itself a colonial artifact. Faced 
with the task of placing Indigenous peoples into the emerging interna-
tional order in the early sixteenth century, the Spanish legalist Francisco 
de Vitoria boldly raised the sorts of new questions this situation demanded 
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but ultimately resorted to (then- )established ways of resolving key matters, 
determining that while Indigenous peoples were capable of reason (and so 
capable of self- determination), they lacked elements of civilization, short-
comings that prevented them from exercising self- determination in the 
international arena (they were not considered as constituting polities akin 
to nation- states). As Chakrabarty aptly puts it, the colonized were placed in 
a waiting room, one they would never seem to be able to leave.20 This is a 
sketch of the establishment of the base set of rules, which continue to dic-
tate today who can “legitimately” make decisions over territory.
 At the time early European intellectuals were constructing a dis-
course around international law—a discourse that would develop over the 
centuries into a force controlling the very parameters of thought and imagi-
nation on a global level—the Inuit were living in the Arctic as they had 
for countless generations. Inhabiting a separate normative universe, they 
were engaged with both meaning generation and meaning maintenance. 
In this universe, stories did not exist embedded in larger understandings 
of “territorial integrity” and “sovereign authority over land” but rather 
within accounts of land and people interrelations predicated on concepts 
of responsibility and respect.21 The land itself was understood to be alive, 
inhabited by all kinds of social entities, each of which demanded respect 
and proper treatment. Within this larger normative framework, questions 
about how people might interact with one another and the land and sea 
around did not trace back to first- order questions about which body had the 
rightful authority to make decisions in this context. First- order questions 
would be about how one might act—they were about the appropriateness of 
the action in question, not who might be appropriately positioned to decide 
how to act.
 This is not to say that the notion of “territory” did not exist in the 
normative universe of the Inuit—different Inuit collectivities inhabited dif-
ferent areas, and boundaries (while not laid out with a surveyor’s preci-
sion) were known and respected. The difference is in the level at which 
such notions functioned. In the story that developed within and between 
emerging nation- states, questions about boundaries were fundamental, as 
within this narrative framework once these matters are settled decision- 
making processes are greatly simplified—the nation- state whose territory 
is within these established lines is accorded authority in decision making 
over this land. In the far north, territorial boundaries were respected, but 
this did not fundamentally address questions about decision making. Deci-
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sion making happened in the context of narratives about responsibilities 
and respectful attitudes—the model was not process driven but grounded 
in substance.
 As intrusions from the south over the last century became more 
numerous, paternalistic, and oppressive, not only did the Inuit continue 
to possess the narratives within which they lived, but more important they 
maintained the power and authority to tell, retell, modify, and reconstruct 
such narratives. Authority is itself a term finding its life within norma-
tive universes, so to say the Inuit continued to enjoy this authority is just 
to acknowledge that they, as with other independent peoples around the 
world, continued to build and maintain worlds of meaning about them-
selves, as the power to do so cannot be taken by another (short of complete 
genocide). This power is at the heart of Indigeneity. This gets us to the heart 
of this form of resistance, of story meeting story: the Inuit can tell stories 
about their relationships to the land, water, and animals as alternate stories 
about how decision- making processes should be understood, about how 
humans should go about deciding how to act in relation to land, water, and 
animals; and they can relate these stories back to the power they enjoy in 
relation to their stories, a power that encompasses not only authority over 
telling and retelling but also the power of critical reflection, modification, 
and world adjustment. That is, in inhabiting a normative universe with 
roots distinct from the cultural and social history of the West, not only do 
the Inuit—in being Indigenous—have a stock of stories that meet those 
of the sovereignty model as challengers in a contest over meaning, but 
they also demand respect as a dynamic meaning- generating community, 
as people who are alive and fundamentally self- determining.
 How do two independent worlds of meaning come to interact? We 
briefly noted, in the context of “international law,” how European powers 
originally understood this task—they unilaterally considered how they 
would interact with the other, and then acted accordingly. One might sug-
gest that this approach issues from the core of their normative universe: 
when faced with a weaker power, they tend to justify procedures and rules 
that facilitate control over all matters of decision making (justifying this at 
least to themselves, but usually in a manner indicating that they mean to 
justify matters to the universe as a whole). Regardless, again, of whether 
the intent was to dominate, the story unfolds as one wherein the European 
narrative comes to dominate. The outcome is the world we now all find 
ourselves inhabiting, for better or worse, where the model of sovereign 
authority envelops all forms of discourse and action on the world scene. It 
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is not clear, however, that an encounter between two normative universes 
should be played according to a rule book used by only one side, and indeed 
there are chapters in the story of the interaction between the West and the 
other that suggest alternate forms of interaction.
 Shortly after beginning their more serious attempts at gaining a foot-
hold in what was to become eastern Canada, the French and British found 
themselves in need of Indigenous allies (most often so they could wage an 
on- again, off- again campaign against each other). This story is illustrative, 
for it tells of a brief period in a certain locale wherein European power met 
a more powerful other. This story is one of compromise, negotiation, and 
the management of interaction according to rules that transcended both 
normative worlds.22 Of course, once power shifted to the incoming Euro-
peans, this period became an anomalous chapter in the longer story of the 
European- Indigenous encounter. This is not to say, however, that it cannot 
speak to contemporary settings, as its lessons are timeless. This all- too- 
brief and ephemeral historical interlude illustrates how two independent 
worlds of meaning can interact in a respectful manner. With differing nar-
rative groundings, with different codes of conduct, different ways of think-
ing of human interaction and human- world interaction, two independent 
worlds must construct a bridge between themselves, each side working 
toward the other.
 But can this be presented as a viable contemporary vision? The appro-
priate response is to inquire into what might be considered “viability” in 
light of the fact of the Indigeneity of the Inuit. “Viability” cannot be deter-
mined simply in light of what one might think of as the reality of the fun-
damental dominance of the narrative of nation- state sovereignty over terri-
tory, as that is a reality that only maintains its “rightfulness” or legitimacy 
on the basis of these very narratives—narrow stories that function to cap-
ture others within their grasp. We cannot be blinded by the fact of politi-
cal and military power, for the question here is about deeper normative 
structures meant to make sense of and justify these more physical forms 
of reality. It is as viable in the here and now as it was centuries ago to imag-
ine the need for a project of bridge building, of a form of dialogue between 
normative worlds.
 It cannot just be about the Inuit arguing for power within the nation- 
state structure or for nation- state status, but rather it has to be about the 
extension of sensibility out to an acknowledgment of the Inuit exercis-
ing their power in speaking of how they would structure decision making 
over land. This power—manifest in “story”—meets narrative based on the 
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magical notion of sovereignty, and it demands acknowledgment. How this 
plays out is not for any observer—from either universe—to say. We see 
slow movement toward a world wherein such bridge building again makes 
sense,23 which makes it ever more imperative that multiple strategies of 
resistance to second- wave colonization be contemplated. Given the way 
that resistance within the universal story tends to be more about coopta-
tion, this move toward challenging the dominant narrative—its presump-
tion of universality, its way of closing off imagination—may be the only 
route forward promising any sort of hope and security for not just the Inuit 
in Canada but for Indigenous peoples across the Arctic region. How would 
decisions about how the Arctic will be “opened up” be made if the Arctic 
states realized that their claims to legitimacy were provincial and that they 
had to sit with Indigenous peoples at a table not as decision makers inviting 
input but as storytellers meeting storytellers?
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